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– v – (Eastern : Section 20 Section 20ZA): FTTPC 27 Nov 2013


Ground Floor Flat 90A Hinton Road – Lambeth : London: LVT 6 Oct 2011

– v – (Eastern : Section 27A Section 35): FTTPC 6 Sep 2013

Berryman v Hounslow London Borough Council: CA 20 Nov 1996

Bhopal and Another v Walia: CA 8 Apr 1999

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References: Gazette 08-Apr-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1089, (1999) L & TR 460
Links: Bailii
Coram: Swinton Thomas, Chadwick LJJ
Ratio: After the landlord asked his tenant to agree to pretend to pay a higher rent for the landlord to give his bank, and the landlord sold on with vacant possession but the tenant stayed, the agreement remained a sham. The new owner had not made a proper enquiry.
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
Leading Case
Last Update: 02 October 2018
Ref: 78383

The post Bhopal and Another v Walia: CA 8 Apr 1999 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Brent London Borough Council v Knightley and Another: CA 26 Feb 1997

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References: Times 26-Feb-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 917, (1997) 29 HLR 857
Links: Bailii
Coram: Hirst LJ, Aldous LJ, sChiemann LJ
Ratio: The daughter of a deceased tenant claimed succession to her mother’s interest in a tenancy which was subject to a possession order.
Held: There can be no succession to a tolerated trespasser under a former secure tenancy.
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Civ 404, Times 15-May-07)
    The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
  • Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL (Bailii, [2008] UKHL 70, HL, Times, [2009] UKHRR 450, [2008] NPC 137, 25 BHRC 663, [2009] 2 WLR 48, [2009] PTSR 281, [2008] 50 EG 73, [2008] NPC 136, [2009] 2 All ER 829, [2009] AC 636)
    The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
    Held: . .
  • Overruled – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC ([2010] WLR (D) 156, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, Bailii, [2010] UKSC 28, [2010] 26 EG 90, [2010] PTSR 1311, [2010] 35 EG 94, 2010] 3 WLR 144)
    The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02 October 2018
Ref: 78571

The post Brent London Borough Council v Knightley and Another: CA 26 Feb 1997 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Bridgegrove Limited v Smith and Smith: CA 20 Mar 1997

Burrows v Brent London Borough Council: HL 31 Oct 1996

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References: Gazette 20-Nov-1996, Times 04-Nov-1996, [1996] 4 All ER 577, [1997] 1 EGLR 32, [1997] 2 FCR 43, [1996] NPC 149, [1997] Fam Law 246, [1996] UKHL 20, (1997) 29 HLR 167, [1997] 11 EG 150, [1997] 1 FLR 178
Links: Bailii
Coram: Browne-Wilkinson L
Ratio: The authority had obtained a possession order from its secure tenant but then agreed to accept payments toward the arrears. The tenant applied for and was granted a declaration that she had on that agreement acquired a new tenancy. The authority appealed.
Held: The agreement had created a new tenancy even after a final possession order had been made, and a A new possession order was required before any warrant could be issued. Had the authority obtained a suspended possession order, no new tenancy might have been created. While a tenant could not sue for breach of a landlord’s covenant while the tenancy was in the state of limbo, if and when the secure tenancy revived, its covenants likewise revived and were to be treated as having been in existence during the limbo period.
An agreement which allowed a tenant to stay on in a house after a possession order had been made, did not itself create a new tenancy, but he might have the status of being a ‘tolerated trespasser’: ‘In the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional does not create a new secure tenancy or licence.’ However, a tenant who had not been evicted could apply under section 85(2) to postpone the date of possession, and, upon such postponement, the secure tenancy would be revived because ‘the date on which the tenant is to give up possession’ would not have arisen and thus the tenancy would not have ended. Until a possession order was executed, the court could by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which had already been terminated.
Lord Browne-Wilkinson said: ‘What, then, is the correct legal analysis? I start from the proposition that where a former tenant is by agreement allowed to remain in possession of the demised property after the termination of the tenancy, the question in each case is quo animo the parties have so acted: depending upon the circumstances, their conduct may give rise to a new tenancy, a licence or some other arrangement. In the present case, on 5 February 1992 the parties plainly did not intend to create a new tenancy or licence but only to defer the execution of the order so long as Miss Burrows complied with the agreed conditions. It cannot be right to impute to the parties an intention to create a legal relationship such as a secure tenancy or licence unless the legal structures within which they made their agreement force that conclusion.
A secure tenancy protected by Part IV of the Act of 1985 is not like an ordinary tenancy. It can only be terminated by an order of the court ordering possession to be given on a particular date or in a particular event. But even determination by order of the court is not final. Until the possession order is executed, the court can by variation of its order change the date on which possession is to be given and thereby revive a secure tenancy which has already been terminated. During the period between the date specified by the order for the giving of possession and the date on which the order is executed there is a period of limbo: the old tenancy has gone but may yet be revived by a further order of the court varying the date for possession. If the parties reach an agreement as to the continued occupation of the premises by the tenant during that limbo period, what intention is to be imputed to them?
In my judgment little guidance is to be obtained from the cases where a tenant holds over after the termination of an ordinary tenancy where there is no possibility that the expired tenancy can revive. The position in relation to secure tenancies is sui generis. In my judgment, the agreement can and should take effect in the way the parties intend, i.e. it is an agreement by the landlords that, upon the tenant complying with the agreed conditions, the landlords will forbear from executing the order, i.e. from taking the step which would finally put an end to the tenant’s right to apply to the court for an order reviving the tenancy. There is no need to impute to the parties an intention to create a new tenancy or licence: the retention of possession and the payment of rent relate to occupation under the old tenancy which is in limbo but which may be revived. In these circumstances I think it is fair to characterise the former tenant as a trespasser whom the landlord has agreed not to evict – a ‘tolerated trespasser’ – pending either the revival of the old tenancy or the breach of the agreed conditions.
Once the effect of section 85 is appreciated, the absurdities which led the Court of Appeal not to accept that Miss Burrows could be a tolerated trespasser disappear. Technically the old secure tenancy is, during the limbo period, no longer in existence and therefore neither the repairing covenants in the tenancy nor the Defective Premises Act 1972 apply. But the tenant can at any time apply to the court for an order varying the date on which possession is to be given and thereby retrospectively revive the old secure tenancy, together with its covenants. If the tenant has complied with the agreed conditions, there can be little doubt that the court would make the required order. Moreover, the tenant will not be a homeless person within section 58(2) of the Act of 1985 because the tenant will be occupying the residence by virtue of any ‘rule of law giving him the right to remain in occupation:’ see section 58(2)(c). If the tenant were in breach of any of the covenants in the old secure tenancy, Brent could apply to vary the order so as retrospectively to revive the old tenancy together with its covenants.
Finally, there is a method (albeit a clumsy one) whereby the order for possession even if an immediate unconditional order, can be discharged or rescinded if so desired under section 85(4). The power in that subsection to discharge or rescind only arises ‘if the conditions are complied with,’ a requirement which cannot be satisfied in the case of an unconditional order. But there is no reason why the order cannot be discharged by consent or, if such consent is not forthcoming, by the court varying the original order so as to impose the agreed conditions and then discharging the varied order.
It was submitted that the fact that the tenancy was granted to Miss Burrows jointly with Mr. Allen whereas the agreement of 5 February 1992 was made with Miss Burrows alone, indicated that the agreement must have given rise to a new tenancy with Miss Burrows alone. Therefore there must be a new tenancy. However, since in my view on its proper analysis the arrangement contained in the agreement of 5 February 1992 gave rise to no new tenancy with anyone, that factor is irrelevant. I therefore reach the conclusion that, in the absence of special circumstances, an agreement by a landlord not to enforce strictly an order for possession, whether conditional or unconditional, does not create a new secure tenancy or licence under Part IV of Act of 1985.
As Brent, by making the agreement of 5 February 1992, did not grant a new tenancy or licence to Miss Burrows as from 12 February 1992. It follows that the possession order of 29 January 1992 was properly enforced. I would therefore reverse the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the trial judge and dismiss Miss Burrows’s action.’
Lord Jauncey of Tullichettle said: ‘whereas an order postponing the date of possession necessarily affects the operation of section 82(2), an order staying or suspending the execution of an order for possession on a stated date has no effect on the operation of that subsection but merely postpones execution so long as the conditions of suspension are complied with.’
Statutes: Housing Act 1985 82 85(2)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case cites:

  • Applied – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA (Times 08-Feb-96, (1996) 28 HLR 469, (1996) 72 P & CR 507)
    The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
  • Cited – Cannan v Hartley ((1850) 9 CB 634, [1850] EngR 9, Commonlii, (1850) 137 ER 1040)
    . .
  • Cited – Gray v Bompas ((1862) 11 CB(NS) 520)
    . .
  • Cited – Oastler v Henderson ([1877] 2 QBD 575)
    The tenancy was for seven years. Shortly after its creation, the tenant left the keys with the agent and asked him to dispose of it or make the best bargain for surrender he could, and left for America. A tenant not being found, the agent returned . .
  • Appeal from – Burrows v Brent London Borough Council CA (Independent 22-Aug-95, Times 21-Jul-95, [1996] 1 EGLR 32, [1996] 1 WLR 1448, (1995) 27 HLR 748)
    . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Swindon Borough Council v Aston CA (Gazette 23-Jan-03, Bailii, [2002] EWCA Civ 1850, [2003] HLR 610)
    The tenant had fallen into arrears, and a possession order had been made. Having cleared the arrears, the possession order fell, but the landlord purported to issue a new tenancy agreement, with no security of tenure. They now sought possession . .
  • Distinguished – Greenwich London Borough Council v Regan CA (Times 08-Feb-96, (1996) 28 HLR 469, (1996) 72 P & CR 507)
    The authority had taken possession proceedings against the secure tenant for non-payment of rent, and obtained an order, suspended on condition as to payments. He again fell into arrears, and the authority made a further agreement. They now sought . .
  • Cited – London Borough of Newham v Hawkins and others CA (Bailii, [2005] EWHC 451 (Admin), Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 451, Times 03-May-05)
    The landlord had obtained a possession order, but the tenant continued in occupation as a tolerated trespasser, claiming entitlement as successors in title. Rent arrears had accrued, but even if the tenant had paid thenm the council would have . .
  • Cited – London Borough of Lambeth and Hyde Southbank Ltd v O’Kane, Helena Housing Ltd CA (Bailii, [2005] EWCA Civ 1010, Times 22-Sep-05, [2006] HLR 2)
    In each case the authority had obtained an order for possession of the tenanted properties, but the court had suspended the possession orders. The tenants had therefore now become ‘tolerated trespassers’. They now claimed that they had again become . .
  • Cited – Richmond v Kensington and Chelsea CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 68, Times 27-Feb-06)
    The borough obtained a possession order of the secure tenancy of a flat occupied by their tenant for nuisance. It was suspended on terms for a certain period. They alleged further breaches shortly before the expiry of the possession order and they . .
  • Cited – Harlow District Council v Hall CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 156, Times 15-Mar-06, [2006] 1 WLR 2116, [2006] BPIR 712, [2006] HLR 27, [2006] 2 P & CR 16)
    The defendant had been subject to a possession order in respect of his secure tenancy. He was later adjudged bankrupt. He asserted that the bankruptcy specifically prevented other action to enforce the debt, and the suspended possession order was . .
  • Cited – White v Knowsley Housing Trust and Another CA (Bailii, [2007] EWCA Civ 404, Times 15-May-07)
    The tenant was an assured tenant. She fell into arrears of rent and a possession order was made, but suspended on terms. The court considered whether she continued to be an assured tenant, and could assert a right to buy the property as an assured . .
  • Cited – Austin v Southwark London Borough Council QBD (Bailii, [2008] EWHC 355 (QB))
    . .
  • Cited – Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 363, Times 28-Apr-08, [2008] 17 EG 162, [2008] L and TR 27, [2008] 4 All ER 459, [2008] NPC 53, [2008] 1 WLR 1350, [2008] 2 EGLR 133)
    The claimant was a council tenant with the right to buy her property. A possession order was made, but then discharged.
    Held: On the revival of the tenancy her right to buy and discount was also revived, and there was no need to serve a fresh . .
  • Cited – Jones v London Borough of Merton CA (Bailii, [2008] EWCA Civ 660, Times 03-Jul-08)
    The court was asked ‘If a former secure tenant of a dwelling-house who has become a ‘tolerated trespasser’ in it decides to cease to occupy it, does his liability to pay mesne profits to his former landlord in respect of the dwelling-house cease . .
  • Cited – Knowsley Housing Trust v White; Honeygan-Green v London Borough of Islington; Porter v Shepherds Bush Housing Association HL (Bailii, [2008] UKHL 70, HL, Times, [2009] UKHRR 450, [2008] NPC 137, 25 BHRC 663, [2009] 2 WLR 48, [2009] PTSR 281, [2008] 50 EG 73, [2008] NPC 136, [2009] 2 All ER 829, [2009] AC 636)
    The House considered situations where a secure or assured tenancy had been made subject to a suspended possession order and where despite the tenant failing to comply with the conditions, he had been allowed to continue in occupation.
    Held: . .
  • Cited – Austin v Mayor and Burgesses of The London Borough of Southwark SC ([2010] WLR (D) 156, WLRD, Bailii Summary, SC Summary, SC, Bailii, [2010] UKSC 28, [2010] 26 EG 90, [2010] PTSR 1311, [2010] 35 EG 94, 2010] 3 WLR 144)
    The appellant’s brother had been the secure tenant of the respondent Council which had in 1987 obtained an order for possession for rent arrears suspended on condition. The condition had not been complied with, but the brother had continued to live . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02 October 2018
Ref: 78761

The post Burrows v Brent London Borough Council: HL 31 Oct 1996 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.


Cadogan Estates Ltd v McMahon: CA 9 Jun 1999

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References: Times 01-Jun-1999, Gazette 03-Jun-1999, Gazette 09-Jun-1999, [1999] EWCA Civ 1470
Links: Bailii
Coram: Stuart-Smith and Laws L.JJ. and Jonathan Parker J.)
Ratio: A provision in a tenancy agreement that the tenancy would cease upon the bankruptcy of the tenant, continued and became part of the terms of a statutory tenancy following the contractual one. The provision was not inconsistent with the idea of the statutory tenancy, and the term was implied into the statutory tenancy.
Statutes: Rent Act 1977 98(1)
Jurisdiction: England and Wales
This case is cited by:

  • Appeal from – Cadogan Estates Limited v McMahon HL (Times 01-Nov-00, House of Lords, Gazette 09-Nov-00, House of Lords, Gazette 16-Nov-00, House of Lords, House of Lords, Bailii, [2000] 3 WLR 1555, [2000] UKHL 52, [2001] 1 EGLR 47, [2001] BPIR 17, [2001] 1 AC 378, (2001) 81 P & CR DG11, (2001) 33 HLR 42, [2000] 4 All ER 897, [2001] L & TR 2, [2000] NPC 110, [2000] EG 119, [2001] 06 EG 164)
    When a tenancy was terminated and was followed by a statutory tenancy, a term in the contractual tenancy that the tenancy should be forfeit on the tenant’s bankruptcy was continued in and inherited by the statutory tenancy. Though perhaps in . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02 October 2018
Ref: 78822

The post Cadogan Estates Ltd v McMahon: CA 9 Jun 1999 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Chesters Accomodation Agency Ltd v Abebrese: CA 18 Jul 1997

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References: Times 28-Jul-1997, Gazette 03-Sep-1997, [1997] EWCA Civ 2137
Links: Bailii
Ratio: A court action begun by the owner’s agent in his own name rather than in the landlord’s name for possession was ineffective. The resulting possession order set aside. He had no locus standi. Only the landlord has that power.
This case cites:

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 02 October 2018
Ref: 79021

The post Chesters Accomodation Agency Ltd v Abebrese: CA 18 Jul 1997 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Crewe Services and Investment Corporation v Silk: CA 2 Dec 1997

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References: Times 02-Jan-1998, [1997] EWCA Civ 2872, [1998] 35 EG 81
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Woolf MR, Millett and Robert Walker LJJ
Ratio: The landlord brought proceedings against the tenant for failure to keep his tenanted farm in a good state of repair. The judge awarded the cost of the landlord doing the repairs himself, making no discount for the possibility that the tenant might in fact remedy the breaches before the end of the tenancy. The tenant appealed.
Held: Since the tenant might decide to repair himself during the term and there was no evidence before the trial judge of the Court of Appeal that the landlord intended to carry out any works of repair at all, the costs of the repairs might be regarded as being a starting point. The court discounted these for the uncertainties as to whether the work would be done. The diminution in the value of a reversion for a tenant’s failure to repair is not represented by the undiscounted cost of repair where the tenancy’s duration is not uncertain. The court gave guidance on what the court should do in the circumstances where the evidential material as to loss is less than ideal.
Statutes: Agricultural Holdings Act 1986, Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 18(1)
This case cites:

  • Cited – Bonham-Carter v Hyde Park Hotel ((1948) 64 TLR 177)
    A party claiming damage for breach of a covenant to repair in a lease must prove that damage. . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Latimer and Another v Carney and others CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 1417)
    The landlords appealed disissal of their request for relief against their tenants for non-repair of the premises. The judge had held that the landlord had not provided appropriate evidence of the damage and costs of repair which it claimed.
  • Cited – Latimer and Another v Carney and others CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 1417)
    The landlords appealed disissal of their request for relief against their tenants for non-repair of the premises. The judge had held that the landlord had not provided appropriate evidence of the damage and costs of repair which it claimed.

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 03 October 2018
Ref: 79627

The post Crewe Services and Investment Corporation v Silk: CA 2 Dec 1997 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Corporation of City of London v Fell and Others: HL 3 Dec 1993

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References: Gazette 26-Jan-1994, Independent 03-Dec-1993, Times 03-Dec-1993, [1994] 1 AC 458, [1993] UKHL 11
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lord Templeman
Ratio: The original tenant under a lease was not liable for arrears of rent on a tenancy continued after an assignment and after the original contract term has ended. The right of a transferee of the reversion to recover rent is, both in common law and under statute, an incident of the ownership of the reversion.
The relationship of landlord and tenant is one of status, not contract, even though created by one.
Statutes: Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 Part II
This case cites:

  • Appeal from – City of London Corp v Fell and Others: Herbert Duncan Ltd v Cluttons (A firm) CA (Gazette 31-Mar-93, [1993] QB 589, [1993] 2 All ER 449, (1992) 65 P & CR 229, [1993] 2 WLR 710, [1993] 1 EGLR 93, (1992) 91 LGR 151)
    An original Tenant is not liable for arrears arising on the tenancy extended by an assignee beyond the original term.
    The vesting of the leasehold estate in the tenant carried with it the burden of covenants that touched and concerned the . .

(This list may be incomplete)
This case is cited by:

  • Cited – Edlington Properties Limited v J H Fenner and Co Limited CA (Bailii, [2006] EWCA Civ 403, Times 12-May-06, [2006] 1 WLR 1583)
    The landlord had assigned the reversion of the lease. There was an outstanding dispute with the tenant defendant who owed arrears of rent, but sought to set these off against a claim for damages for the landlord’s failure to construct the factory in . .
  • Cited – Smith and Another v Jafton Properties Ltd CA (Bailii, [2011] EWCA Civ 1251, [2011] WLRD 314)
    The landlord challenged the right of the tenants to acquire the freehold. Lessees had been subdivided the apartments and then, without the landlord’s consent, assigned them. The new arrangement had increased the number of qualifying tenancies so as . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 03 October 2018
Ref: 79518

The post Corporation of City of London v Fell and Others: HL 3 Dec 1993 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd and Another: ChD 6 Mar 2001

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References: Gazette 15-Feb-2001, Times 06-Mar-2001, [2001] EWHC Ch 702, [2001] 25 EG 159, [2001] 2 LLR 49, [2001] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 49, [2001] 2 EGLR 32, [2001] L & TR 16, [2001] 1 WLR 1681
Links: Bailii
Coram: Lightman J
Ratio: A tenant complained to the landlord about his failure to repair. He ceased paying rent, and the landlord eventually distrained for rent by direct action.
Held: The tenant was unable to claim a legal set-off because there was no context of legal proceedings upon which such a claim must depend, but nevertheless he was able to assert an equitable set-off, because of the close relationship between the claim and the basis of the set-off, which would leave a balance due to him.
This case cites:

  • Cited – Wilkinson And Another v Godefroy (, Commonlii, [1839] EngR 396, (1839) 9 Ad & E 536, (1839) 112 ER 1315)
    The court considered a claim for the recovery of money from a stakeholder to whom it had been entrusted, in which case a demand is necessary to throw upon the depositee a duty to repay. . .
  • Cited – Freeman v Jefferies CE ((1868-69) LR 4 Ex 189)
    (Court of Exchequer) The incoming tenant plaintiff had agreed to buy the outgoing tenant’s interest in a farm at a price determined by two valuers. He paid andpound;2,000 on account; the valuation took place; the plaintiff gave to the outgoing . .
  • Cited – Baker v Courage and Co ([1910] 1 KB 56)
    The plaintiff had owned a public house. On selling the leasehold to the defendants brewers, they had overpaid him by andpound;1,000. He deposited a sum at interest with the defendants. When he came to withdraw the last of the deposit (by coincidence . .
  • Cited – Kleinwort Benson Ltd v South Tyneside Metropolitan Borough Council ChD ([1994] 4 All ER 972)
    A claim for money had and received fell within section 5 Limitation Act, should be treated with caution. Hobhouse J said: ‘The cause of action in money had and received arises when the relevant money is paid by the plaintiff to the defendant.’
  • Cited – Sim v Rotherham Metropolitan Borough Council ([1987] Ch 216)
    The 1870 Act applied where an employee’s contract was terminated in the course of a period at the end of which payment would be made. Scott J said: ‘Mr Goudie submitted that the real question was whether a teacher was entitled to be paid for the . .
  • Cited – Aectra Refining and Marketing Inc v Exmar NN CA (Ind Summary 22-Aug-94, Times 15-Aug-94, [1995] 1 All ER 641, [1994] 1 WLR 1634)
    A time loss claim can found a legal set-off claim against ship owners, provided that the loss claim can be made in the same court. The court referred to a ‘transaction set-off and independent set-off’. Cross-claims must both be due and payable, and . .
  • Cited – Federal Commerce Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc; (The ‘Nanfri’) CA ([1978] QB 927)
    The court considered whether claim as against a shipowner could be set off against sums due under a time charter hire.
    Held: Save for any contractual provision to the contrary a tenant is entitled to deduct from the rent payable, so as to . .
  • Cited – Eller v Grovecrest Investments Ltd CA ([1995] QB 272)
    The court set out the history of the development of the law relating to the availability of set-off in the case where a landlord has levied or intends to levy distress.
    Held: The law had developed, and an equitable right of set off against a . .
  • Cited – Talbot v Frere CA ((1878) 9 ChD 568)
    Sir George Jessel MR said: ‘there could not be a set-off until action brought and set-off pleaded.’ . .
  • Cited – Stein v Blake HL (Independent 19-May-95, Times 19-May-95, [1996] 1 AC 243, Bailii, [1995] UKHL 11, [1995] 2 All ER 961, [1995] 2 WLR 710, [1995] 2 BCLC 94)
    Where A and B each have claims against each other and A is insolvent, the common amount is set off, and the net difference remains as a debt due.
    Hoffmann L said: ‘It is a matter of common occurrence for an individual to become insolvent while . .

(This list may be incomplete)

Last Update: 03 October 2018
Ref: 80707

The post Fuller v Happy Shopper Markets Ltd and Another: ChD 6 Mar 2001 appeared first on swarb.co.uk.

– v – (London : Section 27A): FTTPC 30 Aug 2013

– v – (Southern : Schedule 11): FTTPC 8 Oct 2013


– v – (London : for The Determination of A Breach of Covenant): FTTPC 23 Sep 2013

– v – (London : Section 84) 00AZ: FTTPC 29 Aug 2013

– v – (London : Section 27A Section 20C Section 24): FTTPC 12 Dec 2013

– v – (Midlands : Sections 27A and 19 20C): FTTPC 10 Jul 2013

Assethold Ltd v Abdelhadi, Re Coomassie Road – 21 (LC): UTLC 19 Jan 2018

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